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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
LOIS H. WHITE, Widow of PAUL 
WHITE, deceased, 
Applicant and Plaintiff, 
vs. 
N. P. METTOME COMPANY, THE 
STATE INSURANCE FUND and 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
8193 
This case involves an application before the Industrial 
Commission of Utah by Lois H. White for benefits. under 
the Workmen's Compensation Law on account of the fatal 
industrial accident suffered by Paul White on October 6, 
1953. After a hearing, the Industrial Commission rendered 
its decision denying her claim upon its finding that she 
was not a dependent of the deceased employee. She and 
her attorney have brought the case to this Court for review. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We agree with the facts stated by Plaintiff's attorney 
on page 2 of his brief, that Lois H. White and Paul White 
were married in 1941 and that Paul White was killed in 
the course of his employment on October 6, 1953. The 
State Insurance Fund carried the compensation insurance 
liability of his employer. We also agree with the statement 
that there was a decree of divorce awarded to Lois H. White 
from Paul White on July 10, 1953. But we think that 
Plaintiff's attorney has added some of his own inferences 
and conclusions to the facts which he has stated on page 
3 of his brief. 
With respect to the evidence on the subject of Paul 
White's "quitting drinking", Mrs. White testified (Tr. 6 
and 7): 
"A. Well, I told him that if he'd quit drinking, 
why, then I'd drop the divorce proceedings. And 
he said he'd try. But he didn't for awhile." 
(and at Tr. 8) : 
"A. Well, once or twice after we got the decree 
I talked ·to him about it. * * * he said he was 
quitting drinking, he was doing better about it, and 
asked me if I'd reconsider. And I told him that I 
would if he, if he could show me that he was quit-
ting drinking. And he said that he wanted to start 
coming down and see me again, to show me that he 
was quitting, and that. And I told him it was all 
right with me, if he could show me that he was turn-
ing over a new leaf, as it were, so we could go back 
together." 
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With respect to the time she met him on the street 
and they agreed he would come and see her the following 
Sunday, she testified (Tr. 9) : 
"A. Well, we wanted to get it squared away 
as to whether we would go back together or not." 
In other words, her testimony was that if the fatal 
accident had not happened, they were going to meet to-
gether the following Sunday and discuss whether they 
might be able to go back living together. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT· 1. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS COR-
RECT IN DENYING LOIS H. WHITE'S CLAIM 
BECAUSE SHE WAS NOT A DEPENDENT 
OF THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE. 
On July 10, 1953, Lois White, the applicant and plaintiff 
in this case, filed in the Salt Lake County Clerk's office a 
divorce action against her husband, Paul White, on the 
grounds of mental cruelty. In her complaint she stated 
that they owned an equity in a duplex at 1540 South 11th 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that they also owned furn-
ishings and furniture at that location. She requested that 
she be granted that equity and those furnishings and furni-
ture, and also an automobile which was her own personal 
property. Her husband, Paul White, signed an appearance 
and waiver before a notary public, and this was also filed 
in the Salt Lake County Clerk's office the same day, July 
10, 1953. District Judge D. T. Lewis granted the divorce 
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as prayed for by the plaintiff the same day the complaint 
was filed. The decree granted her the property which she 
had requested. In her complaint Lois White had specifically 
waived any right to alimony or support money. Accord-
ingly the decree did not grant her any alimony or support 
money. Lois White and Paul White did not ever live to-
gether after the decree was granted. He was killed three 
months later. 
The question which was before the Industrial Com-
mission in this case, and is now before the Supreme Court 
for determination, is not so much whether Lois H. White 
was the wife of Paul White on October 6, 1953, when he 
received his fatal accident. The question is not what prop-
erty rights she might have in a probate proceeding relating 
to his estate. The question is whether she comes within 
the statutory provision of the Workmen's Compensation 
Law relating to death cases. Section 35-1-71, U. C. A. 1953, 
specifies: 
"The following persons shall be presumed to be 
wholly dependent for support upon a deceased em-
ployee: 
"(1) A wife upon a husband with whom she 
lives at the time of his death. 
" ( 2) Children under the age of eighteen years 
or over such age," if physically or mentally incapaci-
tated, upon the parent, with whom they are living 
at the time of the death of such parent, or who is 
legally bound for their support. 
"In all other cases, the question of dependency, 
in whole or in part, shall be determined in accord-
ance with the facts in each particular case existing 
at the time of the injury resulting in the death of 
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such employee, but no person shall be considered as 
dependent unless he is a member of the family of 
the deceased employee, or bears to him the relation 
of husband or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or 
brother or sister. The word 'child' as used in this 
title shall include a posthumous child, and a child 
legally adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers 
and sisters shall be included in the words 'brother 
or sister' as above used." 
Lois White was not living with Paul White at the time 
of his death (Tr. 13). Consequently, the only other basis 
upon which she might claim compensation benefits must 
be found in the category of "all other cases", where the 
question of dependency must be determined in accordance 
with the facts. The undisputed fact is that Paul White did 
not support Lois White after July 10, 1953. She did not 
receive any money from him after the divorce decree. She 
was not dependent upon him for any of her support, in 
fact or in law, at the time he received his fatal accident. 
The applicant's attorney has argued that this divorced 
couple might have become reconciled and gone back to 
living together before the end of the six months interlocu-
tory period. That argument is based upon conjecture. Ap-
plicant testified that her husband was "quitting" drinking. 
But she did not testify that she was convinced and satisfied 
that he had "quit". She testified that it was her "hope and 
expectation" that Paul White would "quit drinking and tend 
to his business", and that they could go back to living to-
gether again (Tr. 10). In other words, she hoped that he 
would change his drinking habits and reform. She in-
tended to resume the marriage relationship with him only 
when she was satisfied that he had done so. Whether that 
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would have ever been the situation prior to the end of the 
six months interlocutory period is problematical and con-
jectural. If her hopes had been realized, the proper Jegal 
procedure would have been to apply to the District Court 
which had granted the interlocutory decree for an order 
vacating the decree and dismissing the divorce action. An 
affirmative legal action on her part would have been nec-
essary in order to change her legal status. 
Applicant's situation with respect to hopes of a pos-
sible reconciliation placed her in a position somewhat simi-
lar to that of a woman who is engaged to be married. If 
her fiance is killed in an industrial accident prior to the 
performance of the marriage ceremony, she is not a "de-
pendent" under the provisions of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Law. They may have had their future marriage 
plans all arranged and agreed upon. They may have even 
rented a house or an apartment and purchased household 
furnishings in contemplation of their intended marriage. 
But no matter how near they had come to becoming hus-
band and wife, she is not his "dependent" under the Work-
men's Compensation Law, because Section 35-1-71 provides 
that: 
"* * * the question of dependency * * * 
shall be determined in accordance with the facts 
* * * existing at the time of the injury result-
ing in the death of such employee, * * * ." 
One of the cases cited on page 7 of Plaintiff's brief 
was Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission, 22 Pac. 
(2nd) 1046, 82 Utah 179. In that case the Industrial Com-
mission awarded compensation to Mrs. Alicia Poate as the 
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widow of Frank Poate, an employee of Salt Lake City, who 
was fatally drowned July 28, 1932, in the course of his 
employment. The only question involved in the case was 
whether she was his lawful wife at the time of his death. 
She had sued and obtained an interlocutory decree of di-
vorce from him on Dec. 14, 1927. On May 14, 1928, the 
District Court made an order to the effect that it had been 
brought to the attention of the Court that there was a 
possibility of a reconciliation between plaintiff and defen-
dant. The Court, upon its own motion, ordered that the 
interlocutory decree should not become final until Dec. 13, 
1928. On Sept. 25, 1928, the same Judge who granted the 
decree and made the previous order, made the following 
order: 
"On application of the above named parties per-
sonally appearing in open court, it is ordered that 
the judgment heretofore entered in the above en-
titled case and the default of the defendant herein 
be and the same is hereby set aside and the case 
dismissed.'' 
The parties thereafter resumed marital relations until the 
death of Poate as aforesaid. Under the foregoing facts 
Salt Lake City contended that the Court was without power 
or right to extend the time for the divorce to become final, 
and that in any event it was without power to set aside the 
decree of divorce and dismiss the action by its subsequent 
order of Sept. 25, 1928, as the decree had become final and 
after the end of the term in which the decree was entered. 
(It was stipulated that the term of Court in which the 
decree was entered, had ended at the time said order was 
made.) 
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The Supreme Court held that the order of the District 
Court, setting aside .the decree and dismissing the action, 
was not void on its face and was valid for the purpose of 
the proceeding in question; that each of the parties to the 
divorce action would have been estopped to question the 
validity of the order; therefore, the employer was not in 
any better position to question it. The order of the Com-
mission awarding compensation was affirmed. 
That case was considerably different from the situa-
tion of Mrs. White in our present case. In the Salt Lake 
City case Mrs. Poate had obtained a dismissal of the di-
vorce action and was living with Mr. Poate and being 
supported by him for four years prior to his fatal accident. 
A recent case in which the Supreme Court of Utah 
ruled upon our present question was Loretta Earley, for 
herself and on behalf of Joanne L. Mcintyre, Sharon Mcin-
tyre and Carol Mcintyre, minor children of Jack L. Mcin-
tyre, deceased, vs. The Inaustrial Commission of Utah, 265 
Pac. (2nd) 390. (Decision dated Dec. 30, 1953.) 
The greater part of the Supreme Court's opinion in 
this case deals with the rights of the minor children of the 
deceased employee, Jack L. Mcintyre, to compensation bene-
fits on account of his accidental death. But there was also 
involved in this case the question of whether the employee's 
widow was entitled to compensation benefits. She had 
lived with him for 15 years prior to May 1, 1951. He had 
been the sole support of her and their children until De-
cember, 1950, when she started to work as a psychiatric 
technician. After Mr. Mcintyre left her and the children 
on May 1, 1951, they received no assistance from him. A 
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month after his departure Mrs. Mcintyre filed a divorce 
action. She had not been able to obtain personal service 
of summons upon him, and before she could have summons 
published Mr. Mcintyre was killed in an automobile acci-
dent in the course of his employment on September 29, 
1951. About two weeks later Mrs. Mcintyre married Mr. 
Early. Thereafter she filed with the Industrial Commission 
of Utah a claim on behalf of herself and the Mcintyre 
children. The Industrial Commission denied compensation 
to both her and the children. 
The Supreme Court of Utah held that the children 
were entitled to compensation on account of the death of 
their father. But the Court also held that the Industrial 
Commission was correct in denying compensation to Mr. 
Mcintyre's widow. The Court's opinion in effect held that 
inasmuch as she was not living with him at the time of 
his fatal accident there was no legal presumption that she 
was dependent upon him, and that the facts in the case 
did not justify a finding that she was dependent upon him. 
Koeppel vs. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Company, 194 
Atl. 847, was a Delawar~ case in which the claimant was 
the widow of John Koeppel, who was fatally injured on 
March 15, 1935, in the course of his employment. There 
were no minor children. Claimant had married the em-
ployee in 1903. They lived together until May, 1924, when 
they separated. Thereafter they never resumed cohabita-
tion. For about six years following their separation the 
deceased paid to the claimant $10.00 per week under a 
voluntary arrangement. For the next four years and ten 
months the only payment he made to her was $1.00 just 
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prior to Christmas, 1934, at which time he stated he would 
give her additional sums later on. No civil or criminal 
proceedings were ever instituted by her against her hus-
band to compel him to support her. The Court held she 
was not entitled to compensation, because the Delaware 
Workmen's Compensation Law provided that: 
"No compensation shall be payable under this 
section to a widow, unless she was living with her 
deceased husband at the time of his death or was 
then actually dependent upon him for support." 
Plaintiff's attorney has cited several cases in his brief 
relating to the subject of divorce decrees, but most of these 
cases are not in point in our present discussion because 
they do not involve facts having any similarity to the fac-
tual situation existing in the case at bar. On page 4 of 
Plaintiff's brief is cited the case of Remley vs. Remley, 
193 Pac. 604. On page 5 of Plaintiff's brief is cited Gould 
vs. Superior Court, 191 Pac. 56. On page 6 of Plaintiff's 
brief is cited Gloyd vs. Superior Court, 185 Pac. 995. On 
page 7 of Plaintiff's brief is cited Klebora vs. Klebora, 5 
Pac. (2nd) 965. All four of these cases are California 
decisions involving questions relating to property rights 
after an interlocutory divorce decree had been entered, 
but the final decree had not yet been entered as is necessary 
under the California procedure. None of these cases in-
volved any provision of the Workmen's Compensation Law, 
and none of them involved any question of "dependency" 
upon a deceased employee. That was also the situation in 
the Utah case of Johnson's Estate-Johnson vs. Johnson, 
It 
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35 Pac. (2nd) 305, 84 Utah 168, which was cited on page 
7 of Plaintiff's brief. 
In the case of McGarry vs. Ind. Comm., 222 Pac. 592, 
63 Utah 81, which was cited on page 8 of Plaintiff's brief, 
the deceased employee, Delos Bradley had married his wife 
in 1914, and they had a child in 1915. Bradley lived with 
his wife and child until the early part ·of 1916 and sup-
ported them. Between then and November, 1919, he de-
serted them and assumed the name of "Jack Wilson". His 
wife obtained a divorce from him in Idaho on November 
11, 1919. After Bradley was killed in an industrial acci-
dent in Utah in October, 1922, his former wife applied for 
compensation benefits for their son. The Industrial Com-
mission of Utah granted an award for him, apparently 
upon the theory that he was presumed to be dependent 
because he was legally entitled to support from his father. 
(That was before the statute had been amended to so pro-
vide.) 
The Supreme Court of Utah annulled the award be-
cause the facts showed that the boy was not living with 
the father at the time of the fatal accident. Also, the 
Commission had not made any findings of actual depend-
ency. There was no discussion in the Court's opinion as 
to whether the divorced wife was entitled to any compen-
sation benefits for herself; she had not applied for any 
such benefits. 
In the case of Diaz vs. Ind. Comm., 13 Pac. (2nd) 307, 
80 Utah 77, which is cited on page 7 of Plaintiff's brief, 
there was no divorce action involved. All that was con-
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tained in the opinion written by Justice Straup relating 
to the matter of dependency of the wife and grandchild 
was obiter dicta. He was the only one of the five justices 
who discussed the matter of dependency. Each of the other 
four justices held that the evidence before the Industrial 
Commission was such as to require a finding that Mr. Diaz' 
death did not result from an industrial accident. Therefore, 
nobody would be entitled to compensation as a dependent, 
no matter what their relationship was to the deceased em-
ployee. In that case there was evidence that Diaz had sup-
plied some support to his wife and her granddaughter 
during the period he had lived separately from them. 
In the case of Utah Galena Corp. vs. Ind. Comm., 5 
Pac. (2nd) 242, 78 Utah 495, which is cited on page 8 of 
Plaintiff's brief, one sentence in the Court's opinion shows 
that there is no similarity to the question involved in that 
case and the question involved in the case at bar. At 78 
Utah page 497 is found the following: 
"The only question presented by this appeal is 
whether * * * the Industrial Commission may 
under any circumstances award compensation on ac-
count of dependency to a male child over the age of 
16 at the time of the death of the parent, and who 
is not physically or mentally incapacitated from 
earning.'' 
Point One of Plaintiff's brief states that the. Industrial 
Commission erred in finding that Lois H. White and Paul 
White were not husband and wife. We have carefully ex-
amined the Referee's recommendations and the Industrial 
Commission's decision in this case, and we do not see any 
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finding that Lois H. White and Paul White were not hus-
band and wife at the time of his accident. Whether they 
were husband and wife at the time is not a controlling 
factor in this case. Even though it be conceded for the 
purpose of argument that she was still his wife when he 
was fatally injured, that would not entitle her to compen-
sation benefits unless she met the statutory requirements 
of either living with him or being supported by him. The 
Industrial Commission's findings and decision on those 
latter two points were soundly based on undisputed evi-
dence. 
Inasmuch as Paul White was killed in the course of 
his employment and did not leave any dependents, the State 
Insurance Fund is required to pay his. funeral expenses and 
also to pay $1,800.00 into the Combined Injury Benefit 
Fund, as provided by Section 35-1-68, subsection 1, U. C. 
A. 1953. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission's order, denying compen-
sation benefits to Lois H. White, should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
F. A. TROTTIER, 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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